http://www.arpnet.it/abele

By Martin Jelsma
Transnational Institute (TNI - Amsterdam)
More information on UNGASS can be found on TNI’s website: http://www.worldcom.nl/tni/drugs

(Ed. note: This article give a great insight into how international prohibitionist propaganda sustains prohibitionism and tries to prevent any critical analysis of what is really going on. The prohibitionists would have been better off pretending to listen, instead of pretending that they know what they are doing.)

CLOSING RANKS: THE LOST OPPORTUNITY OF UNGASS

An elderly cleaning lady enters the huge empty UN hall in New York with her polishing cart, to get the venue spic-and-span for an important upcoming meeting. A voice in the background explains: ‘here, in this room, on the 8, 9 and 10 of June world leaders will join forces to confront the drug problem.’As the lady dusts off a globe, in the swaying movement, a roaring helicopter appears spraying herbicides, followed by a fast sequence of other images like burning drug crops, heavily armed soldiers and a farmer processing coffee. The voice ends with the slogan: "A drug free world - We can do it!"

The commercial will soon appear on national television around the world in an attempt to rally public support for the "United Nations General Assembly Special Session to Counter the World Drug Problem Together". Advertising agencies are experts in capturing in a nutshell the content of a message, and the commercial makes perfectly clear what the UNDCP (United Nations International Drug Control Programme) hopes will be the outcome of UNGASS.

In 60 seconds the proclaimed "balanced approach" is rapidly turned into what it really comes down to: a global attempt to close ranks in support of a "war on drugs". Although UN agencies usually carefully avoid using controversial military metaphors in articulating their anti-drug strategies, Mr Pino Arlacchi, UNDCP’s Executive Director, didn’t hesitate to invoke the image at a press conference in Vienna at the end of a week of preparatory meetings for UNGASS. "The ‘war on drugs’ has not been fought and lost," he said. "It has never started."

BACKGROUND

The original impetus for convening a global meeting on drugs came from Mexico back in 1993, when she proposed to hold a real Summit on the issue. The idea was to facilitate a world-wide reflection on the efficiency and viability of anti-drug strategies over the past decade, in order to improve and adapt them with a view to strategies for the next century. After many deliberations and conflicts, the initial idea has since been narrowed down to a Special Session on the issue. The focus is on how to strengthen and expand current drug control policies ten years after the adoption of the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

In November 1996, the General Assembly formally decided to convene a special session, which should "be devoted to assessing the existing situation within the framework of a comprehensive and balanced approach that includes all aspects of the problem, with a view to strengthening international cooperation to address the problem of illicit drugs". It assigned the task of preparing the session to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, with its seat in Vienna, Austria. (Ed. note DEA East) Acting as preparatory body for UNGASS, the commission met five times over the past year.

The US, Great Britain and some others objected to an "independent" evaluation, with the result that the recently installed committee consists of the full chairing bureau of the PrepCom itself, plus some national delegates.

"The main aim of their work will be to recommend how to strengthen future international cooperation against illicit drugs, and to identify measures aimed at reinforcing UNDCP’s activities in the field of drug control." Independant evaluation is nowhere to be found.

UNDCP Executive Director Arlacchi urged member states to send government leaders to attend the Special Session in New York. Many heads of state and ministers will be included in the national delegations, politicizing the debates. In the case of the drugs issue, this is generally a disadvantage.

There is a growing gap between the drug experts on the one hand, where many of the deficiencies of the applied strategies are recognised, and the political level on the other hand, where fear of looking "soft on drugs" is paralyzing genuine reflection. Amongst politicians it seems to be conventional wisdom that the reason force has not worked, is that not enough has been applied and that the logical response, therefore, is escalation _ not re-evaluation.

Absentees in UNGASS are the people most directly affected by drug policy: citizens of developing countries in which drugs production is taking place, and drugs consumers.

In spite of numerous declarations of good intentions about the importance of including civil society in this global debate, direct non-governmental participation in the official meeting will be close to zero. However, some facilities will be available for parallel NGO activities. Many organisations are already planning to air critical views inside and outside the UN venue.

AGENDA SETTING

When the agenda-setting for UNGASS started, several delegations stressed that the upcoming global event should mark the end of the "era of finger-pointing" in the international drug policy controversies.

The old dichotomy between producer and consumer countries should give way to the principle of ‘shared responsibility’ as the cornerstone of international drug control. The agenda, therefore, should reflect a balanced approach which includes all aspects of the drugs problem, and should focus on those points which have been underexposed in the existing conventions.

The agenda is now clearly defined and does indeed reflect criticism emanating from developing countries over the past decade. Several issues currently emphasize the responsibility of the western world: demand reduction, chemical precursors, amphetamines, and money laundering. The PrepCom approved the following documents for the General Assembly in June:

1) A Political Declaration, to reaffirm and strengthen the international community’s commitment to the slogan "A Drug Free World - We can do it!".

2) A document outlining the ‘Guiding Principles on Drug Demand Reduction’.It will constitute "the very first international agreement whose sole objective is to examine the problems, both individually and collectively, that arise because a person might or does abuse drugs."

3. An ‘Action Plan against Manufacture, Trafficking and Abuse of Amphetamine-type stimulants’ (like XTC and speed);

4) ‘Control of Precursors’, containing measures to improve international control of chemicals used in illegal drugs manufacture;

5) ‘Measures to promote international judicial cooperation’, like extradition, mutual legal assistance, transfer of proceedings, etc.;

6) ‘Countering Money-Laundering’, a document that reaffirms international commitment to the 1988 Convention provisions on proceeds of crime, and establishes principles upon which further anti-money laundering measures should be based;

7) A ‘Draft Action Plan on International Cooperation on Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative Development.’

SCOPE

Under the item ‘Eradication and Alternative Development’, the UNDCP is trying to squeeze into the UNGASS agenda, its already highly controversial ‘Strategy for Coca and Opium Poppy Elimination’ (SCOPE). SCOPE calls for a "balanced approach" between law enforcement, alternative development and demand reduction, to rid the world of "the scourge of heroin and cocaine" within 10 year.

By the year 2008 the UNDCP wants to have rooted out the problem at source - crop production. Alternative development is intended to receive the bulk of the nearly US$ 4 billion budget: 74%. Law enforcement is allotted 20% and demand reduction 2%. The UNDCP itself doesn’t have innate funds, so it has appealed to the international community to commit itself to SCOPE to provide the necessary funding.

The strategy focuses on eight key countries in three regions: Bolivia, Colombia and Peru in Latin America; the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar (or Burma as the surpressed democratic opposition prefers to call their nation) and Vietnam in south-east Asia; and Afghanistan and Pakistan in south-west Asia. The supply of illicit opiates and coca derivatives today originates in these "limited number of well-defined geographical areas", according to the UNDCP in summing up the favourable factors for this ambitious programme.

Secondly, says the agency, "after three decades of experience, the international community is now equipped with tested methodologies and the know-how to tackle the problem in the producing areas. The strengthening of the drug control mechanisms in the regions concerned has paved the way for full-scale interventions and most producing countries have adopted well-defined national strategies and action plans that are ready for implementation."

"At the same time," continues the plan’s summary, "it is possible to monitor the areas at risk in order to prevent the ‘balloon effect’ from nullifying the overall impact of elimination programmes." The "balloon effect" is the movement of cultivation to previously untouched areas as a result of increased enforcement in presently cultivated zones (while you squeeze one part of a balloon, the air simply moves to another part without reducing the total amount of air).

The last favourable factor cited is the expression of a "clear political will and the adoption of a common agenda on the part of the international community". The Special Session "offers a historic opportunity for all positive forces to converge", according to the UNDCP.

FUELING THE FIRE

The UNDCP’s attempt to convince the PrepCom to recommend that the Special Session endorse SCOPE didn’t quite succeed. Delegations felt overwhelmed by the detailed elaboration of SCOPE, received shortly before the final PrepCom on 16-21 March.

The Dutch delegation diplomatically called for "feasible goals" both "in substance and target dates" and added that "quantative benchmarks should not be an end in itself".

Mexico sarcastically said it expected an equally detailed plan from the US to illustrate their intention to fully eliminate drug consumption over the same 10-year period, and proposed 2003 as target date for substantial demand eradication.

Executive Director Arlacchi not only has to face skepticism from the delegates, but within the UNDCP he is considered a recently appointed outsider who overruled critical assessments of SCOPE by the agency’s specialists.

In Vienna corridors, he is nicknamed "El Nino", a kind of human equivalent of the meteorologic phenomenon which creates havoc world-wide. But UN Secretary General Annan says that the "renowned Italian crime fighter" has brought vitality and credibility to the UNDCP in its fight against drugs. Observers comment that the Executive Director has "considerable political support", which is clearly true from the US side.

Arlacchi played an important and brave role in fighting the Mafia in Italy, but coca bush and opium poppy is something else, and the small peasants involved in its cultivation are no criminals. In his noble drive to deny organized crime an important source of income, he is also irresponsibly putting the onus for the problem on the shoulders of the relatively innocent growers of the raw material _ those who depend on these crops to survive _ who risk losing their livelihoods as the fight escalates.

Although several PrepCom draft declarations call for respect for human rights, saving the environment, and active participation by local groups in the planning of alternative development projects, most peasants have had very negative experiences with drug control programs over the past decade, precisely with these issues.

With SCOPE, Arlacchi risks fueling the fire of already heated social tensions in drug crop areas around the world. SCOPE relies heavily on partly existing national plans for its implementation, while intending to provide an integrated global framework and a multilateral legitimacy. Colombia serves as a good example to illustrate what the consequences in practice might be.

COLOMBIA

Currently, operations in Colombia to suppress illicit crop production consist primarily of chemical fumigation. Last year, 48.000 hectares of coca and poppy crop were eliminated through the aerial spraying of herbicides. Satellite monitoring shows, however, that the total area under drug-crop cultivation expanded 10 percent. The fields were simply moved to other areas - the ‘balloon’ effect.

These fields will be sprayed again next year -with a stronger granual herbicide- and cultivation (which in itself is not particularly friendly to the ecosystem) will again move to other regions.

A vicious circle, leading to more and more health complaints among the local population and contaminating ever-increasing areas, is set in motion. There is grave concern about the long-term effects of the massive spreading of these chemicals in the vulnerable ecosystem of the Colombian Amazon tropical rainforest, where coca cultivation is concentrated.

The Guaviare and other coca growing regions of Colombia were the scene of widespread social protest in 1996. An estimated 241,000 people participated in massive marches and roadblocks -one of the largest peasant mobilizations in Colombian history-to protest aerial eradication, lack of government support for economic development and the increasing presence of the Colombian military.

In the violence that ensued, twelve people fell victim to extrajudicial executions and seven disappeared. A number of protest leaders subsequently received death threats and seven were later murdered.

The UNDCP - for now - does not directly support fumigation projects in Colombia or elsewhere. The financial support and technical assistance (helicopters and training) is provided by the United States. The agency does support alternative development though, which, jointly with the forced eradication programmes, shape the counter-narcotics strategy of Colombia - the PLANTE (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo) presidential programme.

The counter-strategy of the Colombian government, says SCOPE in describing the future country plan to eliminate illicit cultivation, "is based on two distinct, but complementary courses of action: the carrot and the stick". This complementarity principle also underlies Arlacchi’s plan, according to which alternative development gains in effectiveness when it is backed by "consistently applied disincentives through law enforcement and eradication".

"As the plan progresses, the importance of eradication will grow," notes SCOPE, both to stop cultivation attempts in new areas and resurgence in areas where alternative development has been implemented. To complement "tedious manual eradication", SCOPE includes a research and development plan for "environmentally safe" herbicidal chemicals and biological control agents. Uzbekistan is to be the site of the first experiment with a pathogenic fungus which kills the opium poppy, an agent that "should be safe, suitable and available for all poppy growing areas, especially in Central Asia."

CONCLUSION

Inherent in SCOPE’s underlying logic lies a risk of increased repression, in spite of its proclaimed emphasis on alternative development methods. The complementarity principle combined with a deadline make escalation almost inevitable upon the year 2008 drawing closer. Without a very careful tuning into realistic estimations of results of prevention and demand reduction strategies, any strategies aimed at ‘elimination’ of supply are unrealistic and may well be even undesirable.

Such perilous illusions, encapsulated in the UNGASS slogan "A drug free world - We can do it!", might win broad and high-level political affirmation in New York, if critical voices have not been heard and delegations do not have the political courage to question them publicly. So far, UNGASS seems to offer very little hope to -and in fact is likely to heighten concerns for-the main victims the international community should be worrying about: the problematic user groups and the peasants caught up in the illegal economy.

The world is likely to lose an historical opportunity with this UNGASS, which should have been devoted to evaluating the past decade and learn from its many failures, to analyse the colateral damage wreaked by the war on drugs, and to put on the table alternative strategies more consistent with the laudable original goals of defending human well-being and pursuing policies which protect people rather than cause more harm. The manifesto ‘for a just and effective policy on drugs’ around which many organisations worldwide are uniting, lays out the basic principles for such an alternative strategy.